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Imagine that a district court has consolidated several suits
against a single defendant, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 42(a).1 The court grants summary judgment in the defen-
dant's favor on the largest claim. The affected plaintiff may want
to appeal this judgment immediately, even though the other claims
are still pending. The appellate court lacks jurisdiction of the ap-
peal, however, unless it deems the partial judgment a final deci-
sion; if the judgment is a final decision it can be appealed immedi-
ately,2 but if not, the affected plaintiff must wait for all the
consolidated cases to be resolved before filing an appeal.
If the appeal were from an unconsolidated case involving mul-
tiple claims or parties, the circuit court's determination of jurisdic-
tion would be simple. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(b),' district courts are empowered to "certify" partial judg-
ments as final upon an express determination that there is no just
reason for delay. If the district court does not certify the judgment
t B.A. 1987, The University of Washington; J.D. Candidate 1990, The University of
Chicago.
FRCP 42(a) provides:
Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending
before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue
in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders
concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
' Under 28 USC § 1291 (1982), "[t]he courts of appeals ... have jurisdiction of appeals
from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . ." (emphasis added).
3 FRCP 54(b) provides:
Judgment upon Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties.
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved,
the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all
of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason
for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of
such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however desig-
nated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer
than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties,
and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the
entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the
parties.
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as final, it can revise the judgment at any time until all of the
claims have been resolved, and the appellate court lacks jurisdic-
tion over an appeal from the judgment.'
Currently, however, the courts of appeals disagree whether
Rule 54(b) also applies to lawsuits that are the result of consolida-
tion under Rule 42(a).
Appeal rights in consolidated cases affect both the litigants
and the justice system. Many litigants want to appeal adverse
judgments as soon as they are rendered, rather than when the en-
tire package of litigation is resolved by the district court months or
years later.' Parties want to resolve disputes promptly so they can
get on with their lives. They may be harmed financially if they
must wait a long time to collect or enforce a judgment. Protracted
litigation also increases the risk that memories will fade and that
evidence will be lost or grow stale.' Nonetheless, litigants' interest
in expediting appeals must be balanced against the efficiency ra-
tionale underlying the finality requirement, which seeks to prevent
piecemeal appeals that crowd dockets and waste scarce judicial
resources.
The circuit courts that have considered the issue have reached
three different conclusions on the appealability of uncertified par-
tial judgments in consolidated cases. Some circuits hold that Rule
54(b) does not apply at all because each of the original actions re-
tains its separate identity after consolidation; that is, the consoli-
dation does not produce one multi-party or multi-claim action to
which the Rule 54(b) certification procedure applies. A judgment
in any of the original actions is thus final when rendered, and the
parties can appeal immediately.
' Courts generally speak of "certifying" judgments under Rule 54(b), although the Rule
does not use this term. See, for example, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Mackey, 351 US 427, 436
(1956) and Curtiss-Wright Corp. v General Electric Co., 446 US 1, 4 (1980). The process
involves little more than issuance of an order stating that there is no just reason for delay
and directing the entry of final judgment.
' District court litigation can be a lengthy process. For 1988 and the preceding seven
years, the median time interval from issue to trial in federal district court civil cases was
fourteen months. In some cases, the interval was several years. Annual Report of the Direc-
tor of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 19, 235-36 (GPO, 1988). Par-
ties appealing district court judgments want to file as soon as they can because the "waiting
list" is long in the federal appellate courts. The Administrative Office of the United States
Courts found in 1988 that eighteen percent of the appellate caseload had been pending for
over a year. Id at 6.
6 Stale evidence would not affect an appeal because appellate courts review the district
court record rather than hear or examine evidence. But the "staleness" problem could arise
if the appellate court reversed a district court's summary judgment and ordered a trial:
Litigants would want such a trial to take place as soon as possible.
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Others circuits hold that a partial judgment cannot be final
absent Rule 54(b) certification. In these circuits, the plaintiff must
obtain district court certification before filing an appeal. If the dis-
trict court refuses to certify the appeal, the plaintiff may not ap-
peal until all the other claims have been resolved. Under this ap-
proach, the district courts control appeal rights.
In between these two positions are circuits that employ a flexi-
ble approach, deciding case-by-case whether they will hear an ap-
peal when Rule 54(b) certification was not obtained. These courts
consider the degree of consolidation and the rationale for consoli-
dation to decide whether the judgment was final absent Rule 54(b)
certification. Appellate courts control appeal rights under this ap-
proach, leaving the litigant in something of a bind: he knows that
some partial judgments must go through the Rule 54(b) process,
but is unsure beforehand whether his is such a judgment.
Appeal rights in consolidated cases thus vary among circuits
according to these three approaches." This Comment argues that
partial judgments in consolidated cases should be final only if dis-
trict courts certify them as such under Rule 54(b). In other words,
district courts should make finality determinations in consolidated
cases, as they do in unconsolidated actions that involve multiple
parties or claims.
Section I examines the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that
frame the issue, illustrating that these rules were designed as flexi-
ble tools for the district courts to use in shaping litigation. Section
II discusses and critiques the three approaches taken by the cir-
cuits. Section III recommends adoption of the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits' requirement of district court certification in consolidated
cases. This approach is permitted by Rule 54(b), and this Com-
ment argues that it is truest to the architecture of the federal rules.
But to ensure uniformity, this section proposes an amendment to
Rule 54(b) that would make certification in such cases obligatory
for appellate review. Section III also outlines how this approach
would work in practice.
For a discussion of the "degrees of consolidation," see text at notes 18-19.
8 A fourth group of circuits has not addressed the issue at all; parties in those circuits
are entirely uncertain of their appeal rights.
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I. THE FEDERAL RULES FRAMEWORK
A. Consolidation of Actions Under Rule 42(a)
Rule 42(a)9 allows district courts to consolidate actions involv-
ing common questions of law or fact. District courts thus need not
respect the units in which parties have filed cases; they can com-
bine actions involving overlapping issues and evidence in order to
conserve judicial resources and prevent duplicative proceedings. At
the same time, however, courts must be careful that consolidation
does not prejudice the individual actions.
Rule 42(a) grants district courts-the courts most familiar
with the parties, issues, and evidence-the power to balance effi-
ciency concerns against the interests of the parties. Consolidation
is entirely at the discretion of the district court.'0 One party may
move for consolidation (the moving party has the burden of show-
ing that consolidation is desirable), or the court may consolidate
actions on its own motion." Consolidation orders are interlocutory
and not normally appealable, except under the "collateral order"
doctrine.' 1 2 Appellate courts generally defer to the district courts'
greater familiarity with the litigation and do not disturb consolida-
tion orders absent abuse of discretion. 3
District courts consolidate actions under a variety of circum-
stances to avoid duplicative proceedings. Sometimes they consoli-
date actions that require identical legal or factual determinations.
In In Re Massachusetts Helicopter Airlines, Inc., 4 for example,
the district court consolidated several lawsuits involving a helicop-
ter crash (the passengers sued the owner of the helicopter, the
owner sued the manufacturer, the pilot sued the manufacturer,
etc.) when all of the suits required determining the proximate
cause of the crash.
I See note 1 for the text of Rule 42(a).
1o James W. Moore, Jo D. Lucas, and Jeremy C. Wicker, 5 Moore's Federal Practice 1
42.02[1] at 42.4 (Matthew Bender, 2d ed 1986) ("Moore's").
Id % 42.02[1] at 42.5-42.7.
" See id T 42.02[5] at 42.33-42.34. The doctrine, which applies to all interlocutory or-
ders, was announced in Cohen v Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 US 541 (1949). This
doctrine allows appeal of that "small class" of decisions that
finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the
action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to
require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated. Id
at 546.
" 5 Moore's 42.02[5] at 42.34 (cited in note 10).
469 F2d 439 (1st Cir 1972).
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Often courts consolidate claims of similarly situated plaintiffs
or defendants. In Jones v Den Norske Amerikalinje A/S, 15 for ex-
ample, the district court consolidated the lawsuits of three long-
shoremen, each of whom had sued a shipowner for personal inju-
ries caused by a carbon monoxide leak. Consolidation is also
common when a defendant files an action bringing what are essen-
tially counterclaims against the plaintiff. In Sandwiches, Inc. v
Wendy's International, Inc.,'6 for example, the plaintiff sued the
defendant for disseminating false rumors that the plaintiff had sto-
len a television commercial; the defendant sued the plaintiff for
infringing the commercial's copyright. The court consolidated the
actions because the parties were simply fighting over the copyright.
Finally, courts often consolidate actions that they judge could
or should have been filed as a single action in the first place. In
Ringwald v Harris, the district court consolidated the plaintiff's
suit on a promissory note with his suit to set aside allegedly fraud-
ulent conveyances which were hindering his ability to collect on
the note; the Fifth Circuit commented approvingly that the actions
"could originally have been brought as a single suit."'
Just as Rule 42(a) enables district courts to consolidate cases
for a variety of reasons, it permits various degrees of consolidation.
Cases may be consolidated for discovery, for pre-trial proceedings,
for trial, or for all purposes. In Katz v Realty Equities Corporation
of New York, the district court even ordered seventeen plaintiffs in
private securities cases to file one consolidated complaint. 9 Rule
42(a) also gives courts the power to manage consolidated litigation
by making "such orders concerning proceedings.., as may tend to
avoid unnecessary costs or delays." Courts can, for example, ap-
point a lead counsel to supervise the litigation. °
" 451 F2d 985 (3d Cir 1971).
16 822 F2d 707 (7th Cir 1987).
17 675 F2d 768 (5th Cir 1982).
18 Id at 771.
19 521 F2d 1354 (2d Cir 1975). The Second Circuit held that this consolidation order
was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion. See also In Re Equity Funding Corp. of
America Securities Litigation, 416 F Supp 161, 176 (C D Cal 1976), in which the district
court cited Katz in support of an order for a consolidated complaint.
'0 5 Moore's T 42.02[2] at 42.7-42.9 (cited in note 10).
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B. Partial Judgments in Multiple Claim or Multiple Party Ac-
tions Under Rule 54(b)
1. The history of the rule.
As noted above, Rule 54(b) allows district courts to issue par-
tial judgments in actions involving multiple parties or multiple
claims. Under the Rule, district courts have the power to revise
partial judgments at any time before resolving the entire lawsuit,
unless they expressly determine that there is no just reason for de-
lay and direct the entry of a final judgment.
The purposes of Rule 54(b) emerge from its history, which re-
flects the evolution of ideas concerning what constitutes a judicial
unit. Common-law pleading, in theory, reduced each lawsuit to a
single issue of law or fact.21 Hence, common law courts deemed an
entire action to be the appropriate unit for appellate review; a
judgment was not final unless it completely disposed of an action.22
The federal courts subscribed to the common law rule until the
promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1937.23
The federal rules created a liberal pleading regime that pro-
vided for increased joinder of claims and parties. Actions could in-
volve multiple issues and claims. The drafters adopted Rule 54(b)
"in view of the wide scope and possible content of the newly cre-
ated 'civil action' in order to avoid the possible injustice of a delay
in judgment of a distinctly separate claim to await adjudication of
the entire case. ' ' 24 The drafters realized that some claims within an
action would become ripe for review before resolution of the entire
action, and that the affected parties would endure hardship if they
had to wait to appeal. Consequently, the drafters decided that "the
dimensions of the action as filed would no longer determine the
unit of disposition."2 5
The original Rule 54(b) permitted partial judgments on indi-
vidual claims and their "related counterclaims," expressly empow-
ering district courts to stay enforcement of these partial judgments
21 Plaintiffs could circumvent the single issue requirement by pleading in separate
counts. Richard H. Field, Benjamin Kaplan, and Kevin M. Clermont, Materials for a Basic
Course in Civil Procedure 352 (Foundation Press, 5th ed 1984).
22 See Metcalfe's Case, 77 Eng Rep 1193, 11 Coke Rep 38 (King's Bench, 1615).
23 See Hohorst v Hamburg-American Packet Co., 148 US 262, 264 (1893); Rexford v
Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 228 US 339, 345 (1913); and Collins v Miller, 252 US 364,
370 (1920). These cases were cited by the Advisory Commiftee on Rules for Civil Procedure
in Report of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of
the United States, 5 FRD 433, 472 (1946) ("1946 Committee Notes").
24 1946 Committee Notes, 5 FRD at 472.
22 6 Moore's 1 54.04[3.-3] at 54.50 (cited in note 10).
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and to take steps to secure their benefits.26 Two problems arose in
practice. First, Congress had declared the relevant judicial unit to
be a claim and its related counterclaims; courts encountered a vari-
ety of lawsuits with multiple claims and found this definition of
judicial units to be unduly restrictive. Second, litigants did not
know their appeal rights because district courts simply issued the
partial judgments without saying anything about finality. As the
Advisory Committee noted, uncertain litigants almost always ap-
pealed partial judgments to make sure that they did not sleep on
their appeal rights. 8
To prevent premature appeals and to establish a more flexible
approach to classifying judicial units, Congress amended Rule
54(b) in 1946.29 No longer would the relevant unit for partial judg-
ments be a claim and its related counterclaims. Courts could in-
26 The original Rule 54(b) read in full:
Judgment at Various Stages. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action, the court at any stage, upon a determination of the issues material to a particu-
lar claim and all counterclaims arising out of the transaction or occurrence which is the
subject matter of the claim, may enter a judgment disposing of such claim. The judg-
ment shall terminate the action with respect to the claim so disposed of and the action
shall proceed as to the remaining claims. In case a separate judgment is so entered, the
court by order may stay its enforcement until the entering of a subsequent judgment or
judgments and may prescribe such conditions as are necessary to secure the benefit
thereof to the party in whose favor the judgment is entered. Id % 54.01[3] at 54.13-
54.14.
27 See the following discussions of problems with the original version of Rule 54(b):
Case Comment, Entry of Final Judgment Under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: The Third Circuit Imposes a Requirement of a Statement of Reasons, 56 BU L
Rev 579, 583-84 (1976); and T. J. Carnes, To Appeal or Not to Appeal, That is the Ques-
tion-An Overview of Rule 54(b), 40 Ala Lawyer 213, 216 (1979).
28 1946 Committee Notes, 5 FRD at 472-73 (cited in note 23). In Dickinson v Petro-
leum Conversion Corp., 338 US 507 (1950), a litigant lost its right to obtain review because
it did not appeal a decree that the Supreme Court later ruled was a final judgment. (The
1946 amendment was not yet in effect when the decree was issued, so the district court had
not said anything about the finality of the judgment.) Justice Black, in dissent, stated that
the litigant was a victim of the "jungle of doubt" created by the original version of Rule
54(b). Id at 517. The Advisory Committee cited several other cases in which uncertainty of
appeal rights had caused problems. 1946 Committee Notes, 5 FRD at 472-73.
2" The text of the 1946 amended version of Rule 54(b) read as follows:
Judgment Upon Multiple Claims. When more than one claim for relief is presented in
an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, the court
may direct the entry of a final judgment upon one or more but less than all of the
claims only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and
upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determina-
tion and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which ad-
judicates less than all the claims shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims,
and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the
entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims. 6 Moore's 1 54.01[5] at 54.14 (cited in
note 8).
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stead issue partial judgments on any combination of claims in the
action. The certification process was added to create certainty for
litigants. Absent certification, litigants could not appeal until the
district court resolved the entire action. District courts could pro-
vide for the appealability of partial judgments through
certification.
A third amendment, in 1961, addressed another lingering un-
certainty, making clear that Rule 54(b) applied to multiple party
actions as well as actions with multiple claims.30
Rule 54(b) thus replaced the common law definition of judicial
units with a flexible concept more compatible with the federal
rules regime. As the courts and Congress observed actual litigation
practices under the federal rules and the changing notions of judi-
cial units, they recognized that there were many kinds of complex
actions in which litigants would endure hardship if their appeals
were delayed. Accordingly, amendments were made in 1946 and
1961 to increase the number of situations in which partial judg-
ments could be certified as final. This Comment argues that the
Rule should again be extended, this time to reach consolidated
cases.
2. The rule in practice.
Like Rule 42(a), Rule 54(b) is a flexible tool, vesting district
courts with the power and discretion to shape and manage litiga-
tion. Discretion is lodged in the district courts "because of [their]
firsthand knowledge of the litigation."'" Appellate courts review
Rule 54(b) certifications under an abuse of discretion standard,
generally deferring to the district courts' greater familiarity with
the claims, pleadings, and parties.2
The Supreme Court last established guidelines for district
court discretion under Rule 54(b) in Curtiss-Wright Corp. v Gen-
eral Electric Co,33 stating that certification decisions must follow a
two-step process. First, the district court must "determine that it
is dealing with a 'final judgment.' ,4This requirement was origi-
nally set forth in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Mackey,3 5 where the
30 For a discussion of circuits' disagreement regarding Rule 54(b)'s application to multi-
ple party cases, see Steiner v 20th Century-Fox Film Corp., 220 F2d 105, 107 (9th Cir 1955).
1, 6 Moore's 1 54.04[3.-10] at 54.58 (cited in note 10).
32 Sears, Roebuck & Co, 351 US at 437.
33 446 US 1 (1980).
31 Id at 7.
11 351 US 427, cited in Curtiss-Wright, 446 US at 7.
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Court held that Rule 54(b) does not enlarge or modify the statu-
tory appellate jurisdiction of the circuit courts granted by 28 USC
§ 1291, which limits the appellate courts' jurisdiction to final deci-
sions of the district courts. In other words, the district court must
look to the case law interpreting § 1291 and "cannot, in the exer-
cise of its discretion, treat as 'final' that which is not 'final' within
the meaning of § 1291. ' '36
Upon determining that the judgment can be a final judgment
under the substantive law of § 1291, the court then "must go on to
determine whether there is any just reason for delay. '37 The Court
issued some general guidelines governing this inquiry, but empha-
sized that it was "reluctant either to fix or sanction narrow guide-
lines for the district courts to follow" because "the number of pos-
sible situations is large. '13  The Court did state that "a district
court must take into account judicial administrative interests as
well as the equities involved. ' 39 The relevant judicial interest is the
longstanding federal court policy against piecemeal appeals.40 The
relevant equities of allowing or delaying an appeal vary from case
to case. In Curtiss-Wright, for example, the Court suggested that
delay would be unjust if the losing party was in a precarious finan-
cial position and delay might impair the winning party's ability to
collect on the district court's judgment.41 The Court emphasized
that the task of weighing the equities is one for the trial judge be-
cause he can "explore all the facets of a case."42
Following the general guidance of the Supreme Court, district
and appellate courts have announced more specific criteria to gov-
ern Rule 54(b) determinations. The Third Circuit, for example, de-
veloped a commonly-cited list of factors:
(1) the relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudi-
cated claims; (2) the possibility that the need for review might
or might not be mooted by future developments in the district
court; (3) the possibility that the reviewing court might be
obliged to consider the same issue a second time; (4) the pres-
ence or absence of a claim or counterclaim which could result
in a set-off against the judgment sought to be made final; (5)
351 US at 437 (emphasis in original).
'T Curtiss-Wright, 446 US at 8.
'8 Id at 10-11.
Id at 8.
40 Id.
41 Id at 12.
42 Id.
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miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and solvency
considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of com-
peting claims, expense, and the like.4"
District courts have broad discretion to control Rule 54(b) fi-
nality determinations. They often use criteria identified by the
courts of appeals, as above, but the ultimate decisions rest with
them.
II. THREE APPROACHES TO PARTIAL JUDGMENTS IN CONSOLIDATED
CASES
To date, eight federal courts of appeals have considered their
jurisdiction over uncertified appeals from partial judgments in con-
solidated cases; the question has arisen as parties have appealed
without obtaining Rule 54(b) certification, and the appellees have
challenged the courts' jurisdiction to hear the appeals. The appel-
late courts have -taken three different approaches to the question
whether partial judgments are final decisions, reviewable on ap-
peal. This section outlines and analyzes the three approaches: the
per se rule that partial judgments in consolidated cases are always
final judgments; the flexible approach; and the per se rule that
Rule 54(b) certification is required for finality.
A. The Per Se Rule of Finality: Rule 54(b) Certification is Never
Required to Make Partial Judgments in Consolidated Cases Final
The First44 and Sixth45 Circuits have held that partial judg-
ments are always final decisions because actions that have been
consolidated retain their separate identities. Under this interpreta-
tion, Rule 54(b) and its certification procedure are irrelevant be-
cause the "partial" judgments are not "partial" at all; they are fi-
nal decisions in independent actions.46
13 Allis-Chalmers Corp. v Philadelphia Electric Co., 521 F2d 360, 364 (3d Cir 1975).
The court cited other cases that mentioned one or more of the listed factors. See Cold Metal
Process Co. v United Engineering & Foundry Co., 351 US 445, 452 (1956); Panichella v
Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 252 F2d 452, 455 (3d Cir 1958); TPO Inc. v FDIC, 487 F2d 131,
134 (3d Cir 1973); and Campbell v Westmoreland Farms, 403 F2d 939, 941-43 (2d Cir 1968).
,4 In Re Massachusetts Helicopter Airlines, Inc., 469 F2d 439 (1st Cir 1972). The First
Circuit recently affirmed its adherence to Massachusetts Helicopter in FDIC v Caledonia
Investment Corp., 862 F2d 378, 380-81 (1st Cir 1988).
" Kraft, Inc. v Local Union 327, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Helpers, and Taxicab Driv-
ers, 683 F2d 131, 133 (6th Cir 1982).
46 The First Circuit has suggested that some flexibility in application of the per se rule
may be appropriate, however:
Whether... consolidated actions must remain separate actions under every conceiva-
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The courts have made two arguments in support of this per se
rule of finality. The First Circuit notes that Rule 54(b) applies to
an "action" involving multiple parties or multiple claims, and uses
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 2 and 3 to interpret the term "ac-
tion. '47 Rule 2 provides that there is one form of "action. '4 Rule 3
provides that an "action" is commenced by filing a complaint.49
The First Circuit noted that separate complaints had been filed in
Massachusetts Helicopter (i.e., several "actions" were com-
menced) and that the cases had maintained separate identities, de-
spite consolidation for pre-trial and trial purposes.50 The court
concluded that "the literal reading of Rule 54(b) in conjunction
with Rules 2 and 3 would foreclose any interpretation which man-
dates certification in all consolidated action settings."' 51 In other
words, Rule 54(b) does not apply to consolidations of separately
commenced actions.
Second, both circuits have relied on the "theory behind con-
solidation" outlined in the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v
Manhattan Railway Co. 52 In Johnson the Court stated that "con-
solidation is permitted as a matter of convenience and economy in
administration, but does not merge the suits into a single cause, or
change the rights of the parties, or make those who are parties in
one suit parties in another.""3 The First Circuit stated that
"'merger is never so complete even in consolidation as to deprive
any party of any substantial rights which he may have possessed
had the actions proceeded separately.' ,54 Hence, the Circuit con-
cluded that the consolidated actions retained their separate identi-
ble set of circumstances is a question which need not be answered at this time. We can
see, for example, that in [some cases] there may be no sense in prohibiting a court from
consolidating identical actions to form one new action. No one would appear to be
prejudiced and unnecessary paper work could be eliminated. Massachusetts Helicop-
ter, 469 F2d at 442 n 3.
17 Id at 441.
11 FRCP 2 provides:
ONE FORM OF ACTION.
There shall be one form of action to be known as "civil action."
49 FRCP 3 provides:
COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION.
A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.
1o Massachusetts Helicopter, 469 F2d at 441.
51 Id.
52 289 US 479 (1933). See Massachusetts Helicopter, 469 F2d at 441; and Kraft, 683
F2d at 133.
53 Johnson, 289 US at 496-97.
11 Massachusetts Helicopter, 469 F2d at 441, quoting 5 Moore's 42.02[03] at 42-28
(cited in note 10).
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ties and that relevant judgments were not partial at all; they dis-
posed of an entire action and were final as rendered. This implied
that the litigants retained their appeal rights. Rule 54(b) was thus
irrelevant.
Both of the arguments made by the First and Sixth Circuits
are flawed. The First Circuit's "literal reading" of Rules 2, 3, and
54(b) does not support a per se rule of finality. The court's refer-
ence to Rule 2, which provides for one form of action, is mysteri-
ous. The rule was designed to abolish the distinction between ac-
tions at law and suits in equity, and to abolish the common law
forms of action.5 It is hard to see how this bears on consolidations
and Rule 54(b), and the court offers no explanation.
The reference to Rule 3 likewise is questionable. Rule 3 estab-
lishes the mechanism for commencing an action under the federal
rules, that is, filing a complaint. The First Circuit suggests that the
term "action" is restricted to the judicial unit commenced by a sin-
gle complaint. Rule 54(b) would thus apply to unconsolidated ac-
tions and to each action that has been consolidated (if the consoli-
dation involved multiple parties or claims), but would not apply to
the consolidation as a whole. Nothing in the federal rules, however,
forecloses the application of Rule 54(b) to consolidations. The
rules do not resolve the crucial question: Does consolidation merge
separate "actions" into one "action"? Rule 3 tells us that what
commences by a complaint is an action, but it does not preclude
the possibility that a consolidated lawsuit should also be treated as
one action under the rules. A "literal" reading of the rules simply
does not resolve whether Rule 54(b) applies to consolidated cases.56
Other courts have criticized the First and Sixth Circuits' reli-
ance on the Johnson dicta that consolidation is merely a matter of
convenience and does not change the rights of the parties. 57 In-
deed, the reliance on Johnson is inappropriate. Johnson was a
complicated pre-federal rules case involving a receivership. One of
Field, Kaplan, and Clermont, Civil Procedure at 301 (cited in note 21).
" One commentator has argued that consolidations "clearly fall within the language of
the rule," concluding that "Rule 54(b) should invariably apply to appeals from consolidated
actions .. " Comment, The Finality of Partial Orders in Consolidated Cases Under Rule
54(b), 57 Fordham L Rev 637, 647 (1989). But if the applicability of 54(b) were so clear, the
circuits would not have developed two rules for consolidated cases so much at variance with
this interpretion of Rule 54(b). To provide clear guidance, this Comment argues that the
Rule should be amended to make explicit what is implicit in the structure of the federal
rules.
1 See Ringwald v Harris, 675 F2d 768, 770 (5th Cir 1982); Ivanov-McPhee v Washing-
ton National Insurance Co., 719 F2d 927, 929 n 1 (7th Cir 1983); and Bergman v City of
Atlantic City, 860 F2d 560, 565-67 and n 9 (3d Cir 1988).
[57:169
Appealability of Partial Judgments
the many issues was whether an attack made in one of the suits
against the order in another was a direct or collateral attack. The
district judge was not sure, but held that the attack would be di-
rect if he consolidated the suits. The Supreme Court made its fa-
mous statement in finding that the consolidation did not change
the nature of the attack.58 The Court was not speaking to the final-
ity or appealability of judgments and did not have Rules 42(a) and
54(b) to consider. Hence, Johnson does not compel the result
reached by the First and Sixth Circuits.
In addition, the First and Sixth Circuits' interpretation of
Johnson is not uniformly followed in practice, even by the Su-
preme Court.5 9 Courts have ruled that the rights of parties, includ-
ing appeal rights, are changed by consolidation. In Bowsher v
Synar,60 for example, two suits were filed challenging the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Act, one by a group of Congressmen and one by
an employees' union and its members. The district court consoli-
dated the cases."' When the case was presented to the Supreme
Court, a threshold issue was whether the plaintiffs (now appellees)
had Article III standing to challenge the Act. The Court held that
the union members had standing and that "[t]his [was] sufficient
to confer standing under . . .Article III. We therefore need not
consider the standing issue as to the Union or Members of Con-
gress. '62 Johnson notwithstanding, the rights of the union and the
Congressmen were changed by the consolidation. These parties ob-
tained federal court adjudication of their claims without having to
meet the Article III case or controversy requirement. 3
Lower court cases further discredit the First and Sixth Cir-
cuits' interpretation of Johnson. In In Re Adams Apple, Inc., 4 the
district court had consolidated several bankruptcy cases, including
one in which the United States government was a party. Under
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1), a notice of appeal
must be filed within thirty days of a district court order, but
" Johnson, 289 US at 496-97.
" The Seventh Circuit doubts "that the Supreme Court adheres to all of the language
in Johnson." Sandwiches, 822 F2d 707. See also Bergman, 860 F2d at 565-66 n 9.
60 478 US 714 (1986).
1 Synar v United States, 626 F Supp 1374, 1378 (D DC 1986).
6 Bowsher v Synar, 478 US at 721.
63 The Supreme Court did the same thing in Secretary of Interior v California, 464 US
312 (1984), a case cited in Bowsher, 478 US at 721. The Court asserted jurisdiction in the
case because one of the parties in the consolidated suit had standing, and stated that it did
not have to address the standing of the other respondents. Secretary of Interior v Califor-
nia, 464 US at 319 n 3.
6 829 F2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir 1987).
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within sixty days if the United States is a party. The Ninth Circuit
held that all parties to the consolidated suit had sixty days to ap-
peal, whether or not they were part of the original action involving
the government.6 5 Because of the consolidation, then, some parties
gained an additional thirty days to appeal.6
Additionally, Rule 42(a) itself empowers the district courts to
change or limit a party's rights in order to streamline litigation; it
provides that the courts may "make such orders concerning [con-
solidated] proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary
costs or delay." Courts exercising this power in the interest of effi-
ciency can change the rights of parties considerably. A district
court can, for example, appoint a lead counsel to supervise the con-
solidated litigation, even though this may restrict the actions of
the individual attorneys and thus prevent each litigant from con-
ducting his case as he wishes.6
Strict adherence to the Johnson model of consolidation, em-
bodied in the per se rule of finality, would defeat the efficiency and
judicial economy intended by consolidation. If the courts never al-
lowed consolidation to change the rights of parties, they would be
unable to move consolidations along as procedural units. The per
se rule of finality allows parties to effectively unravel consolidated
cases; they can pursue separate appeals that may result in duplica-
tive proceedings and piecemeal appeals-the very things the con-
solidation was designed to prevent.6
This is not to say that Johnson's focus on the rights of parties
is misguided or that efficiency should be the courts' sole concern.
As noted above, litigants have an interest in prompt appeals. The
problem with the Johnson approach and the per se rule of finality
is that they require courts to hear all early appeals-even when
the benefits to the parties are not compelling or when doing so
65 Id. Accord, Cablevision Systems Development Co. v Motion Picture Ass'n, 808 F2d
133, 136 (DC Cir 1987). The DC Circuit gives, all parties sixty days to appeal, provided that
the actions were consolidated for all purposes and the district court entered a single judg-
ment disposing of all the actions.
60 The Sixth Circuit does adhere to its strict interpretation of Johnson. In Stacey v
Charles J. Rogers, Inc., 756 F2d 440, 442-43 (6th Cir 1985), the court, citing Kraft and
Johnson, held that parties to actions that have been consolidated must independently meet
all filing deadlines.
"1 5 Moore's 1 42.02[2] at 42.7-42.9 (cited in note 10).
68 Immediate appeals may also prejudice the rights of other parties in the pending liti-
gation. For example, a co-defendant appealing a summary judgment in the plaintiff's favor
might try to shift liability to other defendants. During the appeal, the plaintiff could learn
additional legal theories and lines of factual inquiry to use against the other defendants in
the trial court.
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would defeat the purposes of the consolidation. Courts should
weigh the benefits of an early appeal against its possible harms. A
per se rule is inappropriate because these considerations vary in
each case.
A final shortcoming to the First and Sixth Circuits' approach
is that it creates perverse incentives. The approach rewards liti-
gants who file separate actions (which are later consolidated) when
they could and probably should have filed a single action. The liti-
gant who files a flurry of lawsuits imposes costs on the court and
the other parties, yet gains under the per se rule of finality because
he can appeal partial judgments right away, while the litigant who
properly files a single action in the first place must follow the Rule
54(b) procedure. As the Third Circuit has observed:
No well-counseled plaintiff in those circuits would ever join
separate claims in a single complaint; he should instead file a
separate complaint for each claim and then have them consol-
idated. This procedure.., would allow the plaintiff to appeal
an adverse judgment on one claim even while the related con-
solidated claims were still pending in the district court. Such
a result plainly violates the purpose of avoiding piecemeal ap-
pellate litigation intended by the finality requirement of
§ 1291 and Rule 54(b). 9
This result does not serve the purpose of the per se rule of finality,
which is to protect and maintain the rights of parties in the face of
consolidation, not to create rights for people whose claims should
not be handled separately or independently in the first place.
The per se rule of finality, therefore, has little to recommend
it. First, contrary to its proponents' assertions, it is not compelled
by the federal rules or the case law. Second, the rule can nullify
consolidation by allowing litigants to "un-consolidate" cases. Fi-
nally, the per se rule of finality encourages litigants to engage in
strategic behavior when filing complaints in order to gain appeal
rights, undercutting the purposes of Rule 54(b) and the per se ap-
proach itself. Because the per se rule of finality, by definition,
yields no discretion to the courts of appeals, the appellate courts
are unable to combat undesirable litigation practices and restrict
early appeals to those cases where the benefits outweigh the harm.
"I Bergman, 860 F2d at 566 n 9.
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B. The Flexible Approach: Rule 54(b) Certification is Sometimes
Required to Make Partial Judgments in Consolidated Cases Final
The Second, Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits reject a per se
approach to appeals of partial judgments because of the great vari-
ety in the reasons for, and forms of, consolidation. ° Since no two
partial judgments involve quite the same circumstances, these cir-
cuits have opted to retain flexibility in deciding whether Rule
54(b) certification is required. When presented with an appeal
from an uncertified partial judgment in a consolidated suit, these
courts decide case-by-case whether to hear the appeal.7' Their de-
cision turns on factors such as the degree of consolidation, the sev-
erability of the issues appealed, whether the cases could have been
filed as a single suit in the first place, and the harm to the appel-
lant's interests if the appeal is delayed. 2
Two circuits have announced the principles governing their
decisions. The Seventh Circuit stated in Sandwiches, Inc. v
70 See Hageman v City Investing Co., 851 F2d 69 (2d Cir 1988); Bergman v City of
Atlantic City, 860 F2d 560 (3d Cir 1988); Ringwald v Harris 675 F2d 768 (5th Cir 1982);
and Ivanor-McPhee v Washington National Insurance Co., 719 F2d 927 (7th Cir 1983).
71 The Second Circuit found merit in both the per se rule requiring Rule 54(b) certifica-
tion (adopted by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, as discussed below) and the flexible ap-
proach, so it compromised and decided that it would use case-by-case analysis, but with a
"strong presumption that the [partial] judgment is not appealable absent Rule 54(b) certifi-
cation." See Hageman v City Investing Co., 851 F2d 69, 71 (2d Cir 1988). The presumption
can only be overcome by "highly unusual circumstances." Id. Even with the presumption,
this is a discretionary or flexible approach and this Comment analyzes it as such.
The Eleventh Circuit has not yet taken a position on the issue, but may favor the flexi-
ble approach. In Bank South Leasing, Inc. v Williams, 769 F2d 1497, 1500 n 1 (11th Cir
1985), the Circuit dismissed the appeal of a partial judgment in a consolidated suit because
Rule 54(b) certification had not been obtained. The court cited Ringwald, in which the Fifth
Circuit adopted the flexible approach.
The DC Circuit, in dicta, cited with approval "several recent decisions [holding] that an
order deciding fewer than all of several cases consolidated for all purposes does not become
a final judgment" absent Rule 54(b) certification. Cablevision Systems Development Co. v
Motion Picture Ass'n, 808 F2d 133, 136 (DC Cir 1987) (emphasis added). The court then
cited the Seventh and Fifth Circuits, which use the flexible approach, and the Ninth Circuit,
which requires Rule 54(b) certification for all partial judgments in consolidated cases. Thus,
it is not clear whether the DC Circuit would require Rule 54(b) certification for all partial
judgments in consolidated cases or only in cases "consolidated for all purposes."
72 See, for example, Ivanov-McPhee, 719 F2d at 930, in which the pro se plaintiff filed
ten actions alleging employment discrimination. Upon her motion, the court consolidated
them for discovery and trial. The plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of several
of the claims without first obtaining Rule 54(b) certification. The appellate court identified
several factors in dismissing the appeal and holding that Rule 54(b) should have been com-
plied with: the case could have been filed as one action, the consolidation was substantial,
and the appellant's interests would not be undermined by making her wait until all the
actions were resolved (she had requested that the actions be handled together in the first
place).
[57:169
Appealability of Partial Judgments
Wendy's International, Inc.73 that cases consolidated for all pur-
poses must comply with Rule 54(b), and thus any partial judg-
ments must be certified to be appealable. If the cases are not con-
solidated for all purposes, the court will evaluate whether the
issues are sufficiently separate that the court could hear one appeal
"confident that the same problem will not recur on a later appeal
in the same case.' ' 74 Absent this confidence, the court will hear the
appeal only upon Rule 54(b) certification. 75 Similarly, the Third
Circuit announced in Bergman v City of Atlantic City76 that it
would consider the degree of consolidation and whether the consol-
idated suits involved the same parties, forum, and judge.77
The circuits following this flexible approach cite little author-
ity to support their position; instead, they note that neither court
rulings nor the federal rules compel a particular approach, 78 and
advance two policy arguments in support of their flexible solution.
First, these courts argue that a discretionary approach is prefera-
ble to a per se rule because consolidations vary in the degree of
consolidation, the severability of issues, the alignment and inter-
ests of the parties, etc.; flexibility permits the circuit court to
weigh all these factors in deciding whether hearing a given appeal
will best serve the purposes of Rule 42(a) and 54(b).7 e Second,
these courts favor the flexible approach because it gives them some
control over finality determinations and increases their ability to
manage their dockets80
" 822 F2d 707 (7th Cir 1987).
74 Id at 709.
7" The Seventh Circuit reiterated the Sandwiches approach in Soo Line Railroad Co. v
Escanaba & Lake Superior Railroad Co., 840 F2d 546, 548 (7th Cir 1988): "If the cases have
been merged for all purposes, any open question prevents an appeal in the absence of find-
ings under Rule 54(b) . . . ." To determine the applicability of Rule 54(b) to suits in which
the district court consolidation order was unclear or the cases were not merged for all pur-
poses, the court inquires whether the cases are "functionally similar and present overlapping
issues." Id.
76 860 F2d 560 (3d Cir 1988).
"' See Bergman, 860 F2d at 564. The court explained that consolidation for trial cut in
favor of treating the entire case as a judicial unit requiring Rule 54(b) certification, as did
identity of parties, forum, and judge. Id at 564-66.
" See Ringwald, 675 F2d at 770 ("There appears to be little direct authority on this
point"); and Ivanov-McPhee, 719 F2d at 928-29.
", See Hageman, 851 F2d at 71 ("Given the infinite array of consolidated actions that
can arise, we are somewhat hesitant to adopt an absolute rule that will conclusively bind
this Court in all future actions"); Ivanov-McPhee, 719 F2d at 929 ("[T]he policy concerns
involved in the appealability of a consolidated case may lead us in differing directions with
respect to the different kinds of consolidation"); and Bergman, 860 F2d at 567 ("[O]ur
adoption of the case-by-case approach will require individual examination of different types
of consolidation orders ...").
" See text at note 88.
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The courts advocating this flexible approach to partial appeals
in consolidated cases are coriect that consolidations vary enor-
mously. They also are correct that this variety calls for different
treatment in different cases. Their lapse is in assuming that such
case-by-case determinations should be made by the courts of ap-
peals rather than the district courts.
Several problems inhere in relying on appeals courts to make
case-by-case determinations of the desirability of appeals. First, a
trial court is in a better position than an appeals court to evaluate
the need for and consequences of an immediate appeal."' The dis-
trict court has first-hand knowledge of the claims, the parties, and
the evidence; the appeals court only reviews a paper record. Since
it consolidated the cases in the first place, the district court is also
more familiar with the purpose of the consolidation, the overlap of
issues, and the degree of consolidation.s2 Hence, a district court is
better positioned than an appellate court to assess the effects on
the parties and the judicial system of allowing an early appeal.
A second problem with the flexible approach's reliance on the
courts of appeals is that it provides litigants with no guidance con-
cerning their appeal rights. When a litigant receives a partial judg-
ment from the district court, he does not know whether that judg-
ment is final.83 As shown above, the original version of Rule 54(b)
presented just the same problem, and the certification process was
devised to inform litigants of the finality of partial judgments. 4 To
obtain a finality determination under the flexible approach, a liti-
gant must appeal the case. The appellate court will decide either
that the judgment was final, in which event it will hear the appeal,
or that Rule 54(b) certification was necessary for finality, in which
81 See Huene v United States, 743 F2d 703, 705 (9th Cir 1984) (The district court "is
best able to assess the original purpose of the consolidation and whether an interim appeal
would frustrate that purpose"); and Trinity Broadcasting Corp. v Eller, 827 F2d 673, 675
(10th Cir 1987).
82 Appellate courts admit that they have difficulty interpreting district court consolida-
tion orders, which often do not clearly indicate the degree of consolidation. See the Seventh
Circuit's pleas to the district courts for greater clarity and specificity in consolidation orders
in Ivanov-McPhee, 719 F2d at 930 n 2; Sandwiches, 822 F2d at 710; and Soo Line, 840 F2d
at 548. This interpretation problem does not arise when district courts make finality
determinations.
83 See Huene, 743 F2d at 704: "[The flexible approach] has the disadvantage of leaving
the finality of the judgment hazy and subject to varying interpretations. In our opinion, it is
essential that the point at which a judgment is final be crystal clear because appellate rights
depend upon it."
84 See text at notes 27-29.
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event it will dismiss the appeal. This system is grossly inefficient,
since whenever the latter situation arises, appealing the partial
judgment was premature and a waste of the appellant's time and
money; the appellant must try to obtain Rule 54(b) certification
from the district court or wait for the district court to resolve the
entire case.85 The appellee also wastes resources contesting the
appeal.
Conversely, this uncertainty is also unfair in that a litigant
may end up sleeping on his appeal rights. A litigant may believe
that his partial judgment is not final and wait until the entire case
is resolved to appeal, only to have his appeal dismissed as untimely
if his belief was wrong.86 It makes no sense for the litigant to have
to appeal to find out whether his partial judgment was final, and
hence whether he has the right to appeal.
Appellate courts could mitigate litigants' uncertainty by devel-
oping rules or guidelines for different types of consolidations.
While guidelines are helpful to litigants, they cannot significantly
reduce the uncertainty problem inherent in the flexible approach.
Since the chief advantage of the flexible approach is that it permits
case-by-case analysis of partial judgments, appellate courts will
probably be unwilling to bind themselves to a comprehensive set of
rules or categories; in the end, they will reserve the discretion to
handle cases according to their facts, and leave the parties without
a reliable decision on appealability until after the appeal. The Sev-
enth Circuit, for example, announced a once-and-for-all rule for
cases consolidated for all purposes, but has declined to reduce any
other kind of consolidation to a rule.8"
The circuits' second argument in favor of the flexible approach
is that by giving them power to make finality determinations in
85 Courts applying the flexible approach often dismiss appeals without prejudice, al-
lowing the appellant to attempt to obtain Rule 54(b) certification for the partial judgment
from the district court. See, for example, Bergman, 860 F2d at 567; and Ringwald, 675 F2d
at 771.
8' See note 28.
87 Sandwiches, 822 F2d at 709-10. Judge Becker of the Third Circuit has suggested that
there are essentially three types of consolidations and that courts could handle all cases with
three rules: one for cases consolidated for all purposes; one for cases consolidated only for
trial; and one for cases that had not been consolidated for trial. Bergman, 860 F2d at 568
(Becker concurring). This approach would create certainty for litigants, but only because it
is a system of per se rules. Like the bright-line rules adopted by the other circuits, it would
preclude appellate court discretion and case-by-case analysis (once the circuit has developed
its rule for each category). The appellate courts would be precluded from considering factors
other than the degree of consolidation, such as the overlap of issues, the likelihood of piece-
meal appeals, the harm to the party of delaying an appeal, and whether the suit could have
been filed as one action in the first place. No circuit has yet adopted Judge Becker's tripar-
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consolidated cases, it enables them to better control their dockets.
The Second Circuit stated that "there are certain advantages to
preserving some flexibility in the appellate courts in making final-.
ity determinations. 88 The per se rules bind the courts of appeals,
leaving them no role in deciding whether to hear an appeal. They
can review district court certification decisions for abuse of discre-
tion, but this deferential standard gives them little real control
over finality determinations. The flexible approach allows appeals
courts to determine, in the first instance, whether judgments are
final and hence ripe for review. 9
The circuits have not explained, however, why such control is
appropriate for consolidated cases when appellate courts lack it in
unconsolidated actions. By creating the certification requirement,
the drafters of Rule 54(b) made district courts the arbiters of final-
ity in unconsolidated actions involving multiple claims or multiple
parties because district courts have greater familiarity with the
cases. The role of appellate courts is merely to review district court
orders for abuse of discretion. District courts are simply in a better
position than appellate courts to make finality decisions, and their
doing so ensures a more efficient allocation of judicial resources.
If anything, district court control in the consolidated context
should be stronger, not weaker. The district court, which took a
close look at the structure of the case when it consolidated the ac-
tions, has that additional knowledge to draw on when it makes a
finality determination.
tite approach.
8' Hageman, 851 F2d at 71.
89 It is questionable whether the flexible approach will in fact give the appellate courts
the control they attribute to it. Instead, it may simply encourage litigants to seek Rule 54(b)
certification whenever they have a partial judgment in a consolidated lawsuit. Why file a
notice of appeal without certification when it could prove to be a waste of time? Appellants
will probably ask district courts for certification and not appeal unless they get it, knowing
that an appeals court will generally defer to a district court determination that part of the
litigation should not proceed as a separate unit. To obtain needed guidance concerning ap-
peal rights, litigants may effectively give trial courts the discretion to conduct case-by-case
analysis by always requesting Rule 54(b) certification. This parallels the "always appeal"
incentive that arose under the original version of Rule 54(b). See text at note 28. Litigants
are rational and seek to avoid procedural pitfalls. They adopted the "always appeal" strat-
egy to make sure that they did not sleep on their appeal rights. Here, litigants will seek
certification to avoid premature appeals.
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C. The Per Se Certification Requirement: Rule 54(b) Certifica-
tion is Always Required to Make Partial Judgments in Consoli-
dated Cases Final
The Ninth" and Tenth Circuits9' hold that judgments that do
not entirely dispose of consolidated cases are final and appealable
only if certified as such by district courts pursuant to Rule 54(b).
An appellate court thus lacks jurisdiction over a partial judgment
in a consolidated case absent Rule 54(b) certification. This ap-
proach assumes that consolidation merges the separately filed ac-
tions into one "action," which is then governed by Rule 54(b). Rule
54(b) thus applies to all lawsuits involving multiple claims and
multiple parties.
Both circuits adopted this rule in very brief opinions. Neither
suggested that its decision was compelled by precedent; rather,
both criticized and rejected the other approaches and adopted the
per se certification requirement as the most sensible option.92 The
Ninth Circuit called the First and Sixth Circuits' rule that partial
judgments in consolidated cases are automatically final and ap-
pealable "overly mechanical."9 It noted that consolidation is
meant to conserve resources, and that always allowing early ap-
peals could "frustrate the purpose for which the cases were origi-
nally consolidated" and lead to duplicative appeals."'
The Ninth Circuit found two main flaws with the flexible ap-
proach, both discussed above:9 5 it grants discretion over finality de-
terminations to appeals courts rather than to district courts, and it
leaves litigants uncertain about the finality of district court judg-
ments. Requiring Rule 54(b) certification avoids these problems:
discretion is still exercised on a case-by-case basis, but it is lodged
in the courts "best able to evaluate the affect [sic] of an interim
appeal on the parties and on the expeditious resolution of the en-
tire action."9 6
The Ninth and Tenth Circuit approach is most compatible
with the federal rules framework. Rules 42(a) and 54(b) both point
to district court discretion and control over finality determinations
90 Huene v United States, 743 F2d 703 (9th Cir 1984).
" Trinity Broadcasting Corp. v Eller, 827 F2d 673 (10th Cir 1987). As noted in note 71,
the DC Circuit has, in dicta, approved a rule that could be understood either as the flexible
approach or as the per se rule requiring certification.
" Huene, 743 F2d at 705; and Trinity, 827 F2d at 675, citing Huene.
9 Huene, 743 F2d at 704.
9 Id.
" See text at notes 81-87.
Huene, 743 F2d at 705.
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in consolidated cases. The per se certification requirement recog-
nizes that the considerations that led to Rule 54(b) and its amend-
ments apply to consolidated cases as well. The Rule's drafters un-
derstood that some claims in complex actions become ripe for
review before the entire action is resolved. They gave district
courts the power to certify partial judgments as final on a case-by-
case basis because: (1) district courts have a comparative advan-
tage in determining the factual and legal overlap of issues and the
interests of the parties; and 2) litigants need to know their appeal
rights as soon as the district court renders judgment.
As explained above, these considerations are equally relevant
in the consolidation context. Indeed, the argument for district
court discretion in the consolidation context is even more compel-
ling than in the single action context because the drafters of the
federal rules granted district courts the power to consolidate cases
and then manage them. In consolidated cases, district courts con-
tinually evaluate the benefits and costs of joint proceedings. They
can draw on this knowledge when making finality determinations.
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits' use of the existing Rule 54(b)
process allows them to avoid a procedural asymmetry that exists in
other circuits: different treatment of the finality issue in unconsoli-
dated multi-claim or multi-party cases than in consolidated multi-
claim or multi-party cases. All circuits handle unconsolidated cases
under the Rule 54(b) procedure, as mandated by the federal rules.
But other circuits besides the Ninth and Tenth circuits handle
consolidated cases by an entirely different procedure. Circuits us-
ing the per se rule of finality presumptively grant finality to partial
judgments in consolidated suits. Circuits using the flexible ap-
proach allow appellate courts to make finality determinations.
The use of different procedures and different judicial deci-
sionmakers for single and consolidated suits is arbitrary. The pro-
cedure for determining whether a partial judgment in a multi-
claim case is final should not depend on whether the lawsuit
started out as a single action or was the result of consolidation.
The task in either case is the same-to decide whether the benefits
of allowing part of the litigation to proceed as a procedural unit
outweigh the harm. Different factors may become relevant to the
finality determination when the lawsuit was consolidated. But the
procedure for making the decision should not differ just because
the suit was consolidated. Actions that are eventually consolidated
often could and should have been filed as a single action in the
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first place. A dual procedural system, as discussed above,97 simply
encourages strategic filing behavior. Litigants in the First and
Sixth Circuits (which deem partial judgments in consolidated cases
final per se) have an incentive to file actions separately and then
have them consolidated because of the early appeal rights accorded
consolidated cases. In short, the existence of dual procedures un-
wisely makes appeal rights turn on how cases begin, a factor easily
manipulated by litigants.
The Ninth and Tenth Circuit approach, then, has much to
recommend it. Its primary advantage is that it gives district courts
the discretion to make finality determinations; it thereby better
comports with the federal rules, provides litigants with early guid-
ance on their appeal rights, and efficiently allocates decisionmak-
ing power to the district courts. Extending the existing Rule 54(b)
single action framework to the consolidation context eliminates the
problems inherent in dual procedures.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS: ADOPTION OF THE PER SE CERTIFICATION
APPROACH AND AMENDMENT OF FRCP 54(b)
The analysis in the previous section suggests that Rule 54(b),
which was developed to deal with complex suits involving multiple
claims and multiple parties, is equally suited to the problem of
partial judgments in consolidated suits. The Ninth and Tenth Cir-
cuits' per se certification requirement recognizes this fact, and is
therefore superior to the dual procedures advanced by the other
circuits.
A. Amendment of FRCP 54(b)
Although the other circuits could simply adopt the Ninth and
Tenth Circuit approach, uniformity would best be achieved by ex-
plicitly amending Rule 54(b) to govern consolidated cases. Absent
an amendment, courts remain free to adopt other approaches be-
cause extension of the Rule to consolidated cases is not compelled
by its current language; the federal rules do not make clear that a
consolidated suit is an "action" under Rule 54(b). An amendment
would make this clear, requiring all federal courts to apply the rule
to consolidated cases. Just as Rule 54(b) was amended in 1961 to
explicitly apply to multi-party actions (in accord with the interpre-
tation of some courts at the time), it should be amended today to
encompass consolidated cases.
11 See text at note 69.
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The following is a proposed revision of Rule 54(b). New lan-
guage is emphasized.
Judgment Upon Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple
Parties.
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action,
including a consolidated action resulting from a Rule 42(a)
order, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-
party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court
may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but
fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon
an express direction for the entry of judgment ....
B. District Court Standards Under Amended Rule 54(b)
What factors should a district court consider in making final-
ity decisions in consolidated cases under proposed Rule 54(b)? As
discussed above, district courts already perform the finality inquiry
in single actions and have developed standards to guide their deci-
sions based on the parameters outlined by the Supreme Court in
Curtiss- Wright.9 8 The Third Circuit, for example, considers the
factual and legal overlap between the adjudicated and unadjudi-
cated claims, the possibility of piecemeal appeals if finality is
granted, the possibility that future developments in the case might
moot the need for review, the solvency of the parties, the frivolity
of the claims, and other factors.9 These standards and factors
would also be relevant in consolidated cases.
Some additional considerations would come to bear, however.
The court, for example, should consider the degree of consolidation
that it ordered (consolidation for all purposes, consolidation only
for trial, or consolidation only for discovery, etc.) and whether an
early appeal would jeopardize the planned future structure of the
case. Consider a partial summary judgment granted prior to trial
in a consolidated case. If the cases were consolidated for pre-trial
proceedings only (i.e., separate trials were planned), allowing an
early appeal would avoid unnecessary hardship for the affected
parties while creating little risk of duplicative proceedings. If the
cases were consolidated for all purposes, however, allowing imme-
diate appeal of the same summary judgment might result in piece-
meal appeals.
446 US 1 (1980).
' Allis-Chalmers, 521 F2d at 364. See text at note 43.
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The district court should also consider who requested the con-
solidation and who resisted it. Consolidation is often imposed on
one or more of the parties upon the motion of another party or the
court itself. When an appellant resisted the consolidation, the
court should assume that he considered his interests ill-served by
the consolidation, and that he may have convincing reasons why
his appeal should be handled separately from the rest of the law-
suit. On the other hand, when an appellant sought the consolida-
tion, or did not oppose it, the court should assume that he origi-
nally considered the consolidation to be in his own interest. The
appellant probably has little basis to assert that he would now be
burdened or prejudiced if he had to wait to appeal. 100 Finally,
when the court consolidated the actions upon its own motion for
efficiency reasons, it should be careful not to frustrate its own ef-
forts by unraveling the consolidation.
The involuntary nature of many consolidations is particularly
relevant in multiple party contexts. When courts combine lawsuits
involving multiple plaintiffs or defendants, tension may develop
because different parties will want to pursue different litigation
strategies; they may have different interests at stake, desire differ-
ent remedies, or want to advance different arguments or defenses.
These considerations may cut in either direction. On the one hand,
litigants will generally have a strong interest in obtaining immedi-
ate review when a district court judgment affects only some of the
parties. The parties affected by the judgment will want to pursue
their separate litigation strategies and end their role in the case as
soon as possible; it will often be "unjust" to make them wait for
the resolution of actions that they are not involved in, especially if
they had resisted the consolidation.
On the other hand, two factors may weigh in favor of keeping
the case together until final resolution of all the claims. First, al-
lowing an early appeal creates the risk of piecemeal appeals. The
district court may decide-as it did when it consolidated the ac-
tions in the first place-that the benefits of keeping the case as a
single procedural unit outweigh the harm to the parties. Second,
allowing one party to obtain an early appeal could prejudice the
rights of the remaining litigants; the party seeking review may wish
to pursue an appeal strategy that would disadvantage the other
plaintiffs or defendants. 101
100 Recall Ivanov-McPhee, 719 F2d at 930, in which the Seventh Circuit noted that the
plaintiff's interests would not be harmed if she had to wait to appeal because "[i]t was she
who moved to consolidate in the first place."
101 See note 68.
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The district courts may discover other factors that are impor-
tant to finality determinations in consolidated cases. Under the
proposed version of Rule 54(b), district courts would simply con-
sider these factors in making their discretionary finality determi-
nations. In order to certify a partial judgment under the Rule, dis-
trict courts would still have to determine that there was "no just
reason for delay" and expressly direct the entry of final judgment.
CONCLUSION
Rule 54(b) was developed to permit partial judgments in the
broader kinds of actions, often involving multiple parties and mul-
tiple claims, permitted by the new federal rules. The Rule was
amended twice to reflect changing ideas about what constitutes a
judicial unit and to cover different multiple issue situations
brought to light by new litigation practices.
Consolidation of related or similar actions has become a com-
mon way to streamline litigation and ease crowded dockets. Sepa-
rate judgments are sometimes appropriate in consolidated cases
which involve multiple parties or multiple claims. District courts
should have the power to decide whether these judgments should
be final, as they do in single actions which involve multiple parties
or multiple claims. Rule 54(b) has evolved to reflect changing liti-
gation practices under the federal rules and should be amended,
again, to govern consolidated cases.
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